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Abstract—Cyber-physical social system (CPSS) plays an im-
portant role in both the modern lifestyle and business areas,
which significantly changes the way we interact with the world.
The increasing influence of cyber systems and social networks is
also a high risk for security threats. In this paper, we investigate
the potential risks in social networks using a hybrid Bayesian
risk graph (HBRG) model to analyse the temporal attack activity
patterns in dynamic cyber-physical social networks. In this model,
a hidden Markov Model (HMM) is proposed to model the
dynamic influence of activities, which then be mapped into a
Bayesian risk graphical (BRG) model that can evaluate the risk
propagation in a layered risk architecture. Our numerical studies
demonstrate that the framework can model and evaluate risks of
user activity patterns that expose to cyber-physical social systems.
.
Index Terms—Activity Profile Modelling, Risk Analysis, Hid-
den Markov Model, Bayesian Risk Graph, Cyber-physical social
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cyber-physical social networks, such as Facebook,
Twitter, Youtube, Google+, etc., are playing an
important role in our modern lifestyle and business model,
which are significantly changing the way we access to infor-
mation, interact to others, and even change the business model
across the world [1], [2], [3], [4]. In recent, it is reported
that more than 69% of the public uses some type of social
media/networks in American and nearly 80% of businesses
are getting invovled in developing social network resources,
such as social videos, social media advertising, and social
messages [1], [5]. These social networks provide incredible
opportunities and resources for online users, however, there
are also a high risk for the online security threats or attacks.
The social network also makes cyber attackers easier to exploit
vulnerabilities and it is being weaponized by the attackers [6].
With the increasing usage of social networks and the emer-
gence of new technologies, such as the Internet of Things
(IoT), Big Data, cloud computing, the security issues in social
Dr. Shancang Li is with Department of Computer Science and Cre-
ative Technology, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK. Email:
shancang.li@uwe.ac.uk, Tel: +44 (0)117 32 86693.
Dr. Shanshan Zhao is with Department of Engineering, Design and
mathematics, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK. Email:
shanshan.zhao@uwe.ac.uk.
Prof. Qindong Sun is with School of Computer Science, Xi’an University
of Technology, Xi’an 710048, China.
Prof. Yong Yuan is with Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of
Science, Beijing, China. Email: yong.yuan@ia.ac.cn.
Dr. Kewang Zhang is with School of Electronic and Information Engineer-
ing, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China.
networks face novel research problems and challenges [2], [5],
[6]. The hundreds of millions of users are facing security
threats, such as, cyber crimes, identity stolen, device/social
profile hacked, overconfidence, etc. Effective risk evaluation
should be provided to help the social network platforms and
users well understand the security situation they are facing, and
accordingly security and privacy protection solutions should
be developed to help the users stay safe online [7], [8]. In the
past decade, lots of research efforts have been done on security
of social networks, including security risk analysis, abnormal
activities detection, cyber crimes, terrorist attacks, malicious
users or device detections, shortened or hidden URL, etc., to
reduce the potential threats that the users facing. Actually,
most users often woefully unaware of most security threats or
attacks they are facing [8]. It is reported in [9] that there is 70%
of increase in scams (such as hidden URLs, phishing requests,
etc.) in social networks, which spreads rapidly since most users
often more like or re-share links or information posted by their
friends. However, when a user profile is compromised, the
attacker can also spread the scams rapidly. In some cases, the
scammers embraced some popular dating applications (app)
or some adult-themed contents or links to attract more clicks
from users [10].
Many social system security vulnerabilities are exposed to
attackers without knowing by the users. The most common
vulnerabilities can be summarized into following five cate-
gories: (1) careless profile leakage; (2) dumpster diving, the at-
tacker can compromise user identity with information provided
by the user self; (3) information that can be used to attack your
profile, such as hints to help guess your password; (4) links to
malware, (5) corporate spies and activist stalkers. Meanwhile,
in commercial areas, many methods have been developed to
collect user messages that can break the defenses, the emerging
technologies, such as deep learning, cloud computing, big data,
etc., can be effective to do this. The social networks have
become new source of risks and poor security protection can
put the users at serious risks. In [11], the FBI highlighted
that the social network Facebook scamming has become
the most common form of malware distributed in 2016. The
social systems, such as Facebook, Twitter, etc., are
increasingly an effective tool for cyber criminals, terrorist
groups like ISIS. The social systems security are facing severe’
security challenges:
1) Most social systems are unable to secure the environ-
ment for users. It is reported that 2% of the Facebook
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accounts” [11], [12], which means that the social net-
work platforms are unable to provide reliable system to
identify duplicated or fraudulent accounts.
2) Social network scamming are highly-effective and lu-
crative. Only less than 20% of scams can be spotted
by the professional users [11], [13], [14]. The social
networks are becoming the new cyber-weapons of choice
for cyber criminals. The social networks provide unreli-
able “trustiness” for users which may result in rampant
scams spread rapidly. The hight volume of visible social
network scams makes it difficult for security expert to
deal with.
3) Social networks and its data are weaponizing by the cy-
ber criminals. Cyber attackers/criminals can easily target
specific victims through social networks. For example,
the LinkedIn was a key recon tool for the cyber
criminals who executed the Anthem data breach and its
80 million stolen records. The Twitter was the target
of an innovative malware exploit dubbed “hammertoss”,
which is rumored to be connected to Pentagon’s data
breach last summer that took down the security agencys’
4,200 employee email server for two weeks [15], [16].
The main contributions of this work are: (1) to develop
a hybrid risk analysis model for social network, in which
a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is introduced to model
the dynamic user activities that can cause potential risks.
The HMM model takes account of the aggregated influences
of activities of neighbours (such as followers, friends, etc.)
that can affect the activities of a user. (2) a Bayesian risk
graph (BRG) model is introduced in the top layer to analyse
the potential risks that the activities can cause. The BRG
model is able to classify the user activities into three level
(static, dynamic, behaviour) and can dynamically evaluate
the potential risks that caused by user activities. (3) A node
mapping scheme is proposed that can map the HMMs in the
bottom layer to the Bayesian nodes in the BRG model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews the related works and Section III details the
hybrid Bayesian risk model. In Section IV, the risk evaluation
framework is proposed based on the HBRG model for social
networks. Section V concludes the paper with a summary and
discussion.
II. RELATED WORKS
The social network platforms afford users both opportu-
nities and risks. In 2016, social network platforms, such as
Twitter, Facebook, Youtube made strenuous efforts
to purge risky social networking practices to ensure users
safety on social networks. More than 360, 000 malicious
or inactive accounts have been suspended. In recent, a lot
of research efforts have been made on investigating novel
research problems and challenges in security risks that the
social networks are facing. In [16], a framework is proposed
that can separate the spammers and unsolicited bloggers from
the genuine experts of a specific domain by using the hyperlink
induced topic search (HITS). The proposed framework is able
to help recommendation system and alike services to identify
bloggers, however it is unable to do more deep investigation,
such as event tracking, social network forensics, and timeline
matching, which are important in forensics analysis and risk
evaluations. Li et al. presented a profile matching schemes for
social networks named Scalable and Privacy-preserving Friend
Matching protocol (SPFM) [17]. This scheme can provide
a scalable friend matching and recommendation solutions
without revealing the users personal data to the cloud. In
[18], a social privacy protector is proposed for preserving
privacy information in social networks. It is able to identify the
fake profile by analysing the user’s friend list. The developed
classifier utilizes a machine learning algorithm to identify the
fake account by measuring connection strengths of the user
with the people in friend list based on a heuristic that considers
several features, such as common friends, common groups,
common posts, etc. However, this method is unable to mark
the users and it does not take into account the microbloggers
that may affect the results.
In recent, with the research progress made in big data anal-
ysis, a number of research works have been done on analysis
of forensics in social networks. In [19], a forensics analysis
framework is proposed that is able to identify important data
sources for automated forensic analysis on social network
user data. The proposed identification-graph can visualize the
identify graph based on the social networks data without the
collaboration of the social network operators. The proposed
framework does not take the affect of neighbors influences in
their event tracking. In [20], coupled HMM model is proposed
to describe the temporal activity patterns in social networks.
This model is able to accurately learn models with sufficient
observations. In [3], a HMM model is proposed to address the
information integration problems.
In our previous works [2], we investigated the security risks
in mobile systems and proposed a multi-layered hierarchical
Bayesian network [2]. The system is able to dynamically
analyse the potential risks in mobile systems by integrating
static analysis, dynamic analysis, and behaviour analysis in
a hierarchical framework. The risks and their propagation
through each layer are well modeled by the Bayesian risk
graph, which can quantitatively analyze risks faced to both
apps and mobile systems. In [20], Vasanthan et al. investigated
the user activity patterns by using a Markov model methods
based on the observed data and a clustering algorithm is
proposed that can group users according to the interaction
behaviours. Tu et al. proposed a collaborative scheme based
on hierarchical and hybrid Bayesian networks (HHBNs) to
investigate the information integration [3], [21]. The HHBNs
are used to analyse a terrorist attack scenario. However, the
proposed methods are unable to dynamically analyse the
activity pattern on social networks. Riek et al. investigated
the cybercrimes in social networks based on a parsimonious
model, which is able to identify risk causal factors that
reduce users’ intention to use online service. In [23], Ross
et al. proposed a socio-physical approach by taking the joint
interaction and integration of social and physical into a sys-
tem to improve emergency response and preparedness. The
proposed methods can evaluate and reduce risks by enabling
3an informed-coordinated response strategy, which is effective
for static social activities and physical activities, however it is
unable to deal with the dynamic user on social networks.
It is clear that a good model of user activity can be very
helpful for analysing the risks and security threats for the
activity patterns in dynamic social networks. In the following
sections, we will introduce a hybrid model by using the well-
developed HMMs and the BRG we have developed previously.
The HMMs are able to model complicated dynamic user
activity patterns in social networks, meanwhile the BRG can
model the causal factors of potential risks caused by these
activity patterns.
III. HYBRID BAYESIAN RISK MODEL
A. Threats and Risks in CPSS
As mentioned above, the social network platforms are free
to use for users, in which the risk management and evaluation
are critical but inadequate for the incredible resources. Most
social network platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook,
LinkedIn et al., are using proactive risk management and
evaluation scheme to monitor users anomalous activity based
on the behavioral analysis and clustering algorithms [4], [5],
[6]. The attackers or potential criminals may also contin-
uously explore the vulnerabilities by mixing various attack
techniques, such as profile attacks, scamming, fake apps, like-
jacking, etc. In many cases, the attackers can collect sensitive
privacy information from users’ profile by combining different
pieces of information in many different ways. Generally, we
can group the possible attacks into two categories: (1) Vertical
attacks, which focus on a specific social network site or
specific user, and (2) Horizontal attacks, which focus on the
cross-correlation networks to mine the sensitive information
that might be useful for committing attacks. The information
might come from multiple different sources (such as social
networks, emails, IoT, interested forums, etc.). The dumpster
diving attack is a typical horizontal attack, in which an attacker
can cross-correlated and complement the attributes of a user’s
profile by mining his different profiles in other social networks,
posts, and replies for posts, etc.
Typical features of social networks include free webspace,
building profiles, building conversations/content, messengers,
creating pages, etc. These features introduce new threats/risks
like social network worms (such as Koobface), botnet,
hijack, phishing scams, trojans, shortened links, data links,
and APTs, etc. Actually, in social networks, these threats/risks
are no longer a single type of attacks. It becomes a security
attack scheme by integrating data collection, processing, data
mining from numerous internal and external sources in a real
time way. The attacks might be systematic and occurs rapidly.
Therefore, the security analysis and risk evaluation schemes
for social networks should be able to provide a comprehensive
and rapid response. It is necessary to develop a security
risk/threat analysis model by incorporating the social network
influence as perceived by the users, which should be designed
to be able to real-timely identify the major factor leading the
security risks.
B. Hybrid Bayesian Risk Model
The hybrid Bayesian risk model has a two-layer and inter-
connected architecture as shown in Figure 1. Basically, the
Hybrid Bayesian Risk Graph (HBRG) model consists of a
hidden markov model (HMM) layer and an interconnected
Bayesian risk graph (BRG) network. In the bottom layer, the
HMM is used to model the activities of user in dynamic
social network, which describes the states, observations, and
the aggregation of influences of neighouring nodes. In the
example in Figure 1, we have multiple HMMs and each
might represent different activities that correspod to a node
in BRG layer. The HMM is powerful for modelling users’
activity evolution in social networks according to a Markov
chain with a hidden state that is influenced by the collective
activity of the neighbouring of the user. Meanwhile, the BRG
network (also known as risk causal network) is a probabilistic
graphical model that represents a set of featured risks and their
conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
[2]. In the HBRG model, the nodes represent the risks and the
links between nodes, and layers represent probabilistic causal
dependencies.
Fig. 1. Hierarchical Bayesian Risk Graph Model
1) HMMs: The HMM is powerful for modelling sequential
states [3] that has been widely used in network activities
modelling. Since the user activity in social networks has
distinctly non-Poissonian characteristics [3], [20], furthermore,
the activities of neighbouring users (followers, friends in social
network) can significantly affect user activity, the HMM can
well describe user activity and explicitly take into account the
interaction between users by introducing a coupling between
two stochastic processes. The works in [3], [23], [24], [25],
[26] show that the coupling HMMs can well model a prob-
abilistic process of status and the interactions between these
activities. Actually, in social networks, the user activity has the
following features: (1) the activity of users are dynamic; (2)
the individual activity may be preferentially affected by other
linked users (such as followers, friends, or even some unlinked
users); (3) the states of users are unobservable. The HMM is
4able to model the hidden states, which correspond to different
patterns in user activity. In social neworks, the state transition
can be influenced by its neighbors and it is possible to explain
the observed data and predict the future activity of a user [20].
With a learning model, the HMM can cluster users and find the
resulting cluster structure allowing intuitive characterization of
the users in terms of the interaction dynamics between a user
and his social network.
In this work, the user dynamic activity in social network can
be modelled by the following three components: User States;
(2) Observation density; (3) Influence of neighbors. We use a
three - tuple Hi = {Qi, Ti, Zi} to represent an HMM Hi.
Let t = {t1, t2, . . . , tN} denote the time-stamps of a spe-
cific user’s activities over a given period-of-interest. The time
duration T = {τi = ti − ti−1|i = 1, 2, . . . , N}.
Definition 1. User State. In a HBRG, we use Qi to denote the
states of a user i, which could be active (Qi = 1) or inactive
(Qi = 0).
Let Qi ∈ {0, 1}(i = 1, . . . , N) denote the states of a user,
Qi = 0 means it is in inactive state at period τi, and Qi = 1
means it is in an active state. It is clear that the state of Qi is
dependent only on Qi−1, and we have
P0 =
[
1− p0 p0
q0 1− q0
]
(1)
and
P1 =
[
1− p1 P1
q1 1− q1
]
(2)
in which p0, q0 denote probabilities from the inactive state to
the activate state.
Definition 2. Observation. In social networks, the user states
are unobservable, the observations T = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τN} are a
series of activities among suspicious users, tweets, and things
with a time stamp associated with each link between two
entities in social networks.
Definition 3. Influence of neighbours Z. In addition to Qi−1,
the evolution of Qi is also influenced by other users in social
networks (such as friends, followers, etc.) through activi-
ties like post, reply, like, retweet, comment,
etc.
In this work, we use Zi represent the influence of the
neighbours, which can be described by
P (Qi|Qi−1, Zi) = P0(Qi|Qi−1) · (1− φ(Zi))
+P1(Qi|Qi−1) · φ(Zi) (3)
in which φ(Z) : Z 7→ [0, 1] is assumed as the simplified
capture of the evolution of Qi.
Since Zi is a function of the activity of all the neighbours,
assume that Zi is dependent on Qi−1 from its past history,
however it is related to Zi−1. Then we have
P (Zi|Qi−1i , Zi−11 ) = P (Zi|Qi−1) (4)
Eq. (4) presumes that user aggregation de-correlates Zi from
its past history.
Each HMM provides new information corresponding to
the node in the Bayesian networks and saves the influence
results back into the network. It can be seen that according to
the Ti and Zi, we can forecast the Ti+1, it is of immense
significance in tasks such as potential attacks, advertising,
anomaly detection, etc. in social networks. A simple posteriori
(MAP) predictor of the form [3]
τˆi+1|map = argmaxT f(τi+1 = T |τi,Zi) (5)
More details about the HMMs optimization and prediction
can be found in [27]. In the model, each HMM corresponds
to a node in BRG and the observation can directly be updated
using the prior probability. In social networks, the observation
T might be imperfect and in practical some new approaches
can be used (such as data mining, etc.) to improve the
parametrized HMMs.
2) Bayesian Risks Graph Model: In our previous work [2],
we described a multilayer Bayesian risk graph model that
consists of three layers and each of them forms a directed
acyclic graph based on the featured risks. The link between
nodes denotes the probabilistic causal dependencies and each
node maintains one or more conditional probabilities table
(CPT). In this work, we applies similar scheme but the nodes
can maintain dynamic CPT(s). The interconnected BRG con-
tains three subnetworks: (1) intra-network; (2) inter-network,
covers the connections between two adjacent networks; (3)
cross-network, the links between behavior network and static
network. Virtual nodes can be added between cross-network
and inter-network to reduce the relation space and computation
complexity.
In HBRG, the HMMs can estimate the transition probabil-
ities of risks in CPTs as described above. The sophisticated
HMMs can provide accurate CPTs evaluation to test whether a
risk can cause other effect or make contribution on other risks.
In this work, we use the Twitter dataset to statistically learn
risk features at the static, dynamic, and behavioural networks
to build accurate CPTs.
In Figure 1, a typical hierarchical Bayesian Risk graph
(HBRG) is proposed, which integrates a hierarchical risk
analysis architecture into a Bayesian risk graph. Figure 2
shows an example of HMM, where Zi denotes the aggregated
activity of neighbouring nodes.
Fig. 2. HMM Model
Figure 3 shows a two-layer HBRG model, in which the top
layer BRG Layer addresses a Bayesian Risks Graph (BRG)
5that can provide a friendly risk evaluation framework. The
HMM layer in the bottom can well describe the dynamic
temporal patterns of user activity in social networks.
Fig. 3. Two-layer HBRG
In social network risk modelling, one or more vulnerabilities
may cause more than one threats (risks). The risk states or
its propagation are usually constructed as a Bayesian graph
model G = {V,E}, where V and E denote variable risks
and links between risks, respectively. The edges in G can be
modelled with local conditional probability distributions. For a
node v ∈ V, a conditional probability distribution P (v|Pa(v))
is used to describe the transition.
The process that one or more vulnerabilities propagate
to one (or more) different threat(s) could be defined as a
dependence graph. The risk states or its propagation are
usually constructed as a DAG and the transition between
nodes could be modelled with local conditional probabilities.
In social networks, the BRG can model, analyse, and predict
risks.
Definition 4. Dynamic Conditional probability table (CPT). In
a BRG, one needs to specify the qualitative parameters. Each
node maintains a dynamic CPT to describe the conditional
probability distribution for a particular combination of values
of its parental nodes.
Definition 5. Hierarchical Risk Template. In social networks,
we group the risks into following three categories:
1) Behavior Risk, which includes social network behaviors
that might cause potential attacks or privacy leakage,
etc., such as profile collections, tweets
mining, etc..
2) Dynamic Risk, it involves potential activities that attempt
to compromise security in social networks.
3) Static Risk, it includes the potential risks and threats
based on the static analysis, such as malware, size
analysis, permission analysis, virus matching, etc.
The risk template provides BRG a template that describes
the basic potential risks of an activity profile in social net-
works.
The independent influence can be modeled as
P(τi|Q) = P (τ |Q)
P (τ)
=
P (τ |Q)P (Q)
P (τ |Q)P (Q) + P (τ |Q)P (Q) (6)
in which P (Q) denotes the prior probability of states and
P (τ) the posterior probability of observations. The aggregated
influences can be modeled as
P(τ |Q) = P (τ |Q1Q2)P (Q1)P (Q2)
+ P (τ |Q1Q2)P (Q1)P (Q2)
+ P (τ |Q1Q2)P (Q1)P (Q2)
= P (τ |Q1Q2)P (Q1)P (Q2)
+ P (τ |Q1Q2)P (Q1)P (Q2) (7)
It is clear that the causal risks could be a compound of a
set of attacks. To well model the joint effect of risks in social
network, a risk classifier is effective. There are many types
of attacks that can occur in a certain social network process.
In HBRG, we model them as behaviour risks. We use the
observation (Obsv) to determine which risk or attack occurred.
In a dynamic social network, it is difficult to determine which
attack occurred, since each attack can cause any value of Obsv.
However, we can use the Obsv to determine the most likely
event that occurred and we return that as an answer.
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT WITH BRGS IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
As discussed before, the proposed HBRG model is able to
model the risks in social networks. In this section, a specific
scenario is proposed to demonstrate the effectiveness of HBGR
by analysing security issues in online social networks. In
this work, we use the ‘Chorus-CDT’ to collect data through
the Twitter Stream API based on a set of keywords. The
keywords are derived from the ‘user activity profile’, and a
list of ‘cybersecurity terms’ [2], [3], [20].
1) keywords: In practice, the security keywords can be
extracted based on a trained security vulnerability keywords
extractor (SVKE). The SVKE can be trained using text from
security blogs, common vulnerabilities and exposures descrip-
tion, official security bulletins, etc.
2) Filtering and cleaning data: The tweets data should be
preprocessed using a security filter. In this work, we
collected many tweets with embedded links from 6 Jan 2017
to 17 Jan 2017. The reason that most spam and malicious
messages are sent out with embedded links. The collected
tweets are pre-precess before do the analysis. Two meth-
ods are used to identify malicious tweets, (1) The trend
microweb reputation blacklist; (2) we use keywords devel-
oped in Section II. The tweets are analysed by extracting
fields Content, Links, Hash tags, sender data
and its frequency.
3) Probability: The above HMM model is used to model
the dynamic user activity profile. The states of user are
unobservable and the observation is based on these activities.
A. Attacks in Social Networks
Specifically, we consider following nine most common
attacks in Twitter: Fake like-jacking; Fake plug-in/sharing
scams; Fake app; Malware attacks; Phishing attacks; Evil Twin
attacks; Identity theft; Cyberbulling, and physical threats.
61) Like-hijacking: the basic idea is to use fake Like
buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons that
install malware, spreading attacks. This attack attempts to get
user to copy and paste JavaScript or a link into their browser
is a big scam-warning sign.
2) Fake plug-in/sharing/offer scams: in social networks,
users can be tricked into downloading fake browser extensions
that can pose like legitimate extensions but stealing data,
including passwords, auto-filled form, and other information
from the infected system. This kind of scams can be spotted
if they offer to provide additional features, fake offers or
messages, to trick users to install fake plug-in, extension, or
join a fake event or group on the social network.
3) Fake apps: Fake apps have risen since 2013. The apps
appear to be legitimate but often they contain some malicious
payload that purported to convince them, it could used to
harvest data, aggressive advertising tactics to sell the user’s
data, browsing habits to a third-part advertising network, etc.
4) Malware attacks: it comes in many shapes, sizes, and
purposes ranging from viruses, spyware, and bots. In this
attacks, the malware can either be infection or concealing,
the former malware can spread and replicate itself from one
users to the next. The concealment malware includes Trojan
horses, rootkits, backdoors, and keylogger, etc. The XSS attack
(Cross-site script) can forces a user’s web browser to execute
an attack’s code.
5) Phishing attacks: it attempts to obtain sensitive infor-
mation such as passwords, usernames, credit card details, etc.
for malicious reasons. The phishing attacks always connect
to account hack, spamming links, malicious url, re-tweets,
etcs. The activity was tied to a hack, resulting in hundreds
of identical states updates to particular band profiles. The
resulting activity includes re-entering the log information
(usernames, passwords), receiving volumes of spam within the
accounts.
6) Evil Twin attacks: namely impersonation. This kind of
attacks are increasing in social networks. It impersonates users
while using that profile for financial gain, defamation, cyber-
bulling, physical crimes, and personal identifiable information
gathering. A user can protect its account by settings or
networking configurations such as Twitter has four privacy
levels that.
7) Identity theft: is becoming an increasing attack in social
networks since it is easier to perform but very dangerous. The
identity theft is related to attacks such as dumpster diving,
account hijacked, profile theft, email scams, and password re-
usages, etc.
8) Cyberbulling: or cyberharassment, is on the increase
in social networks, especially among child, pre-teen, or
teenagers. The cyberbulling behaviour can include unlike in-
formations, such as pages, images, links, or behaviours such as
posting rumours, threats, disclose victim’s privacy, pejorative
labels, etc. This attack is always tied to attacks such as identity
theft, fake scams, etc.
9) Physical threats: the on-line attacks can put people in
physical risks. An attacker can gain access through technical
means and physical means by bypassing security control,
TABLE I
RISKS AND POSSIBLE CAUSALS IN TWEETS
Compound risks Possible causal risks Atom risks
Fake Followers
Profile attack
Like-jacking
Information gathering
Profile attack
Like-jacking
Information Gathering
Fake Plug-in/offer
DDoS
Botnets
Sniffing
MitB
API Attacks
DDoS
Botnets
Sniffing
MitB
API Attacks
Spamming
Email-based Spam
Context-aware spam
MitB
Email-based spam
Botnets
Malware
Profile attack
API Attack
Password attack
MitB
Worms
XSS
Like-jacking
Email-based attack
MitB
MitB
Like-jacking
Password attack
Phishing
Identity theft
Profile attack
API Attack
Password attack
MitB
Worms
XSS
Like-jacking
Profile attack
Password attack
like-jacking
API Attack
MitB
Worms
XSS
Evil Twin
Profile attack
Cyberbulling
Physical attack
Dumpster diving
Identity theft
Dumpster diving
Botnets
Profile attack
Identity theft
Profile attack
XSS
Phishing
Information gathering
Email-based attack
Password attack
Email-based Attack
Password Attack
XSS
Profile attack
Information gathering
Cyberbulling
Harassment
Identity theft
Phishing
Password attacks
Information gathering
Information gathering
Password attacks
Harassment
Physical threats
Profile attack
Cyberbulling
Information gathering
Physical access
Identity theft
Phishing
Password attacks
Physical access
Password attacks
such as, leakage of proprietary information, gain access, block
social network, etc.
An attacker can combine the above attacks to perform a
complicate attack by behavior analytics, automation, machine
learning, and other intelligent capabilities that have the ability
to do really complex math in a millisecond are just a few of
the layers needed to detect and prevent identity fraud.
B. Number results
Based on the collected Tweets, we summarized the possible
attacks and causal in Table. I, in which the first colum address
the main risks in this dataset, the second column addresses
the possible causal or linked attacked, and the third column
address the atom risks that cannot be divided further. Based
on this table, a CPT can be easily set up.
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RISKS AND POSSIBLE CAUSALS IN TWEETS
Risks Possible causals New atom risks
Fake Followers
Profile attack
Like-jacking
Information gathering
Profile attack
Like-jacking
Information Gathering
In this example, the probabilities of attacks
Profile attack, Like-jacking, information
gathering can be derived according to the model in
Section III. A CPT can be set up and the probability of
Fake Follwer happened can be derived as shown in
Figure. 4, in which the probability of Profile attack
happened is {high : 30.7%,middle : 49.1%, low : 20.7%},
the probability of attack like-jacking found is about
56.6%, and the Information gathering happened
with a set of probabilities {content : 24.8%, features :
35.6%, frequency : 39.5%}, then the probability of attack
Fakefollower happened is 58.9%.
Fig. 4. Risk analysis for Fake Follwer Attacks
Fig. 5. shows the risk and attack analysis for the collected
data, in which if the attacks profile attack, like-jacking, infor-
mation gathering are confirmed occurred, then the probability
that attack Fake Follower happened is 97.3%
Fig. 5. When all causual attacks happened, the probability of Fake
Follwer Attacks happens
Figure. 6 shows an example of the CPT at node Fake
Follower, which can be dynamically updated by the HMMs.
Fig. 6. CPT at Fake Follwer Attacks
Since in social network risks analysis, the proposed system is
able to dynamically analyse the risk and attacks according to
the real-time observations. It is also possible to anticipate the
risks for next stage according to the collected social network
data.
Fig. 7. Example of risk analysis for Fake Follwer Attacks
In Fig. 7, an example is introduced to show how to dynam-
ically evaluate the final risks that an attack happened by ap-
plying a classifier. The Follower Attack could be caused
by three attacks: profile attack, like-jacking, information gath-
ering. In the classifier, we defined the experiential rules that
can classify the causal attacks based on the observations.
One of the goals of this work is to obtain a high-level
understanding of various types of attacks on Twitter. The
proposed model can analyse the risks or attacks from different
viewpoints, for example, time ranges, keywords, users, tweets,
etc. Figure 8 shows the BRG model for risks described in Table
I.
Table III shows the test results, in which P (pa) denotes the
probability of ‘Profile Attack’, P (lj) denotes the probability of
Like-jacking, and P (ig) denotes the probability of information
gathering. The P (FF ) denotes the probability that ‘Fake
Follower’ happened. It can be seen, in round 1, when all three
attacks happened, the probability of ‘Fake Follower’ happened
is 97.3%. In round 2 to round 6, we tested how the P (FF )
changed when P (pa), P (lj), and P (ig) changed.
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a HRGB model for risk analysis in
social networks, which can take risk analysis based on the
dynamic activity patterns. The proposed model integrates the
8Fig. 8. BRG Model for Twitter Attacks
TABLE III
TEST RESULTS FOR ‘FAKE FOLLOWER’ ATTACK
P (pa) P (lj) P (ig) P (FF )
r1 100 100 100 97.3
r2 30.7 56.6 24.8 58.9
r3 30.7 60.4 24.8 59.5
r4 30.7 56.6 39.5 60.0
r5 20.2 56.6 24.8 53.4
r6 49.1 56.6 24.8 63.6
HMMs and Bayesian Risk Graph model to provide real-time
risk evaluation. It can also retrieve the causes of attack or
foresee potential attacks in the dynamic networks. We are
continuing to refine the HBRG model to further improve its
performance.
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